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Volume 16, Number 11, Part 1 (April 1, 2010) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Uncertainty returns with renewed terrorist attacks  
The terror attacks in Moscow, Kizlyar, and now Khasavvurt this week seemed to 
signal, more than any other recent attack—even the Nevsky Express bombing—
that Russia’s hiatus from terrorism is over.  While the North Caucasus region has 
been roiling for some time, prompting Security Council meetings on site in the 
wake of assassinations just last year, it only now seems to have struck home that 
a dramatic rethink is in order.  Whatever policies the Kremlin has been pursuing, 
from the targeted elimination of identified rebel/terror leaders to the efforts to 
spread wealth around the region, they do not appear to have taken hold; new 
challengers rise to take the place of those defeated or purchased. 
 
For Russia, because of the nature of the political regime, such attacks do 
particular damage.  The Putin, and now Putin-Medvedev, regimes are founded 
on a core of siloviki, former employees of the power organs, and the nature of the 
regimes suggest a strong authoritarian slant.  Some analysts have suggested 
that Russia’s citizens made a conscious trade of the personal freedoms and 
liberties won during the Yel’tsin era for a more orderly and secure society with 
Putin.  (1)  If the Putin-Medvedev administration is not capable of delivering on 
the expectations of security, Russia’s political leadership may suffer long term 
consequences of resumed terrorist attacks. 
 
The response of the country’s tandem leaders also reflects a rift in the dynamic 
of leadership that seems ever more prevalent as Medvedev’s presidency 
progresses. Putin was initially “geographically handicapped” by his absence from 
Moscow during the attacks, while Medvedev was quick to respond to the news.  
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Calling a meeting with security officials before Putin was back in Moscow, 
Medvedev elicited public reports on the state’s response to the attacks from 
leading ministers and the Moscow mayor, and remarked, “we will continue our 
efforts to stamp out and combat terrorism in our country. We will continue our 
counterterrorist operations with unflinching resolve until we have defeated this 
scourge.” (2) 
 
Medvedev’s rhetoric did shift as he referred to the terrorists as “animals,” while 
placing flowers at a makeshift memorial in Lubyanka Station, (3) however, he has 
represented a more nuanced approach to the terror problem.  The day after the 
Metro bombings, in a meeting with the Chairperson of the Presidential Council for 
Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Ella Pamfilova, Medvedev gave this 
short hand version of his Caucasus policy: “Our policy in the Caucasus must be 
reasonable, it must be up to date, it must involve different people in various 
processes, helping them with socialisation, but at the same time it must naturally 
work to prevent terrorist acts and unbridled crime and corruption, which are also 
endemic in the Caucasus.” (4) 
 
By contrast, Putin has very much underscored that his response to terrorism 
continues to focus on the power ministries: “[I]t’s a matter of honour for law 
enforcement bodies to scrape them [the terrorists]  from the sewers and into the 
daylight.” (5)  
 
Putin should, perhaps, be concerned that someone will worry why the terrorists 
weren’t caught first in the outhouses, as he once demanded, and now need to 
fished from the sewers. 
 
Perhaps the oddest element of the response to the Metro bombings, however, 
was the lack of coverage on Russian television.  Live coverage and analysis, as 
well as critical information about the attacks, victims, and security status of the 
train system, was not provided by Moscow’s main television station until hours 
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after the events.  As one commentator asked: “Whose go-ahead were the 
channel directors waiting for in order to change the broadcast network?”  (6) 
 
It is worth noting that the differences between Putin’s and Medvedev’s responses 
do not necessarily represent a continuation of diarchical competition, although 
there have been trends suggesting that the edge between the Kremlin and the 
Prime Minister has been growing more keen, as each made efforts to underscore 
differences between them.  The recent terrorist attacks likely will exacerbate any 
tension, but Putin and Medvedev as leaders are nonetheless closely linked.  For 
those imagining that a blow to Putin’s reputation might sustain a rise in 
Medvedev’s popularity, it seems unlikely. 
 
As Leonid Radzikhovsky, a Moscow journalist and political analyst recently noted 
in an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:  
“There is no such connection here that what is a loss for Putin is a gain for 
Medvedev. There is an entirely different problem. If Putin’s authority crashes 
down, then Medvedev’s authority will crumble right down with it.” (7)  Medvedev 
is a creation of the Putin regime, and has not managed, as yet, to develop a 
strong enough foundation to launch himself solo. 
 
Of course, the terrorist attacks serve as a reminder that challenges to Putin could 
appear, not from Medvedev’s seemingly more liberal team, but from an 
increasingly militaristic and vengeful siloviki faction, unwilling to allow Russia to 
endure another period of anxiety and trepidation, as terrorists strike in and 
around Moscow and other major centers.  Russia’s population, already wary of 
the state’s handling of terror threats could seek a more militant solution, giving a 
siloviki challenge a populist veneer. 
 
It seems the bombers in Moscow, Kizlyar, and Khasavyurt have accomplished at 
least a part of their aim:  Uncertainty is back in Russia.  One Russian 
commentator encapsulated the sad reality that terrorism forces upon those in its 
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path: “There is no guarantee that any of us will return home safely after stepping 
into the Metro or getting on a bus.” (2) 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) Several analysts commented on the nature of a perceived social contract 
between the Putin administration and Russian citizens, see for example, 
comments by Igor Yurgens, cited in The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, No. 8 (19 
February 2009) via http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1508.shtml.  
(2) Transcript of Special Meeting following Terrorist Attacks in the Moscow Metro 
29 Mar 10, Kremlin Official Website via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2010/03/29/1556_type82912type82913type82917
_225016.shtml.  
(3) Beginning of Meeting with Mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov following a Visit to 
the Lubyanka Metro Station, the Site of One of the Terrorist Attacks, 29 Mar 10, 
Kremlin Official Website, via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2010/03/29/2152_type82912_225022.shtml.  
(4) Beginning of Meeting with Chairperson of Presidential Council for Civil 
Society Institutions and Human Rights Ella Pamfilova, 30 Mar 10, Kremlin Official 
Website via 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2010/03/30/2029_type82913_225051.shtml.  
(5) Factbox – Putin, Medvedev reaction to bombings in Russia, 31 Mar 10, 
16:16:33 GMT, Reuters via 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE62U1US.htm.  
(6) “Tragedy on the capital’s metro, peace and quiet on TV: Why on earth do we 
need television like that?,” by Vera Tsvetkova, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 Mar 10; 
BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union via Lexis-Nexis Academic.  
(7) “Letting The Air Out?” by Robert Coalson, 18 Mar 10, The Power Vertical blog 
via http://www.rferl.org/m/a/1987487.html.  Quotes from an interview conducted 
by RFE/RL with Moscow-based journalist and political analyst Leonid 
Radzikhovsky (???????????? ?????? ??????? 18 Mar 10 via 
http://www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/1986937.html).  
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(8) Commentary by Matvey Ganapolskiy, Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in 
Russian 1400 gmt 30 Mar 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Legal Issues 
By Sergei Tokmakov 
 
E-justice is on its way to Russia 
The Russian federal law on judicial transparency becomes effective July 1, 2010.  
(1) One of its most important provisions is the requirement for courts to publish 
all decisions on Internet databases that are freely accessible to public. While the 
implementation system for the law still needs substantial work, it should, 
nonetheless, help alleviate corruption problems, improve judicial practice and 
comprehension. (2) 
 
The law is an element of the Federal Special Program, “Development of the 
Judicial System of Russia 2007-2011,” sponsored by the Ministry of Economic 
Development. The main goals of the Program are an overall improved quality of 
justice and the protection of citizens’ rights. (3) Chairman of the Supreme 
Arbitration Court Anton Ivanov stated that increased court transparency is one of 
the most important steps towards curtailing corruption. “If a court petitioner 
understands that a favorable decision is forthcoming due to similar precedents, 
he will not need to offer a bribe… anomalous court decisions are more visible.” 
(4) A nationwide Web-based platform for courts has been implemented in order 
to facilitate the publishing of court decisions and the exchange of information 
between the courts. This platform also provides for videoconferencing and 
secure data transmission. (5) 
 
Deputy Justice Minister Yuri Lyubimov claims that the Arbitration (Commercial) 
Court system leads the way in a “revolutionary” manner with the publicly-
accessible databases of the courts’ decisions that were established years before 
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the July deadline. (6) This is due, in part, to the nature of the courts’ commercial 
disputes, for which there is sufficient demand for timely access to previous 
decisions. When the Supreme Arbitration Court held an auction for the contract 
to provide technical support for their database, the winning bid was a negative 
number. In other words, the winning company, a large legal web portal, was 
actually willing to pay to maintain the arbitration courts’ databases. The Supreme 
Arbitration Court’s representatives are optimistic about the possibilities of various 
contracts with privately held online legal research services; such collaboration 
can make compliance with the judicial transparency law not only more complete, 
but profitable, as well. (7) 
 
There are only 112 Arbitration Courts in the country and 3500 Courts of General 
Jurisdiction and, unfortunately, the latter will have a much harder time 
implementing the provisions of the law. Commercial cases are more uniform, and 
thus, easier to record automatically than other civil or criminal cases. Courts of 
General Jurisdiction deal with cases that often contain private information that 
needs to be kept confidential, such as the personal data of victims and 
witnesses. Courts of General Jurisdiction also tend to have less advanced 
equipment; many of them do not have Internet access. (8) 
 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the highest judicial body within the 
Courts of General Jurisdiction system, called on his regional colleagues to get 
down to work, rather than scare political leaders with stories of the colossal sums 
of money it would take to implement court transparency before the July deadline. 
However, some of the lower courts are facing significant hurdles. First, there are 
legal difficulties over how to reconcile the transparency requirement with privacy 
laws. Even if confidential data is blocked out, the full case can still be tracked 
down by the published case number and facts. If confidential data and case 
numbers are blocked out, the published facts by themselves would not be useful 
as legal precedents. Even with the confidentiality precautions, many courts would 
still be vulnerable to violation of privacy lawsuits from citizens in small towns and 
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villages, where people know each other and can easily deduce who the litigants 
and/or defendants are by the published facts alone. (9) 
 
There are also technical difficulties: there is a large volume of information to be 
published, but not enough workers to do the confidentiality editing and 
publishing. Larissa Kalgina, press secretary of the Zabaykalsk Krai Court, claims 
that the Court will be able to publish only half of the documents in a timely 
manner, as required by the transparency law. (10) 
 
The current wording of the law also presents problems. Article 15 prohibits 
publication of cases “on matters of national security.” Russian jurisprudence does 
not define the scope of this term, and the provision can thus be used to withhold 
publication of political cases, even if they were tried in an open court. (11) The 
law delegates the right to regulate the scope of many other provisions to the 
courts themselves. This creates potential for abuse, especially in light of judicial 
ineptitude and conservatism towards electronic media. “Apparatus, through 
reliance on internal rules and regulations, might be able to claim practically any 
information as confidential. This will cancel out all of the achievements of the 
law,” comments attorney Anna Panicheva. (12) 
 
Nevertheless, experts are generally optimistic about the possibilities for the law’s 
application. (13) The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation, 
while criticizing the vagueness of certain provisions of the law, calls it an 
important step towards the elimination of legal nihilism, which is prevalent in 
modern Russian society. (14) Despite internal inadequacies and abuse potential, 
the law is an important step in the right direction because it puts pressure on 
courts to increase transparency, and it creates tools to help citizens participate in 
the judicial process. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) Federal law of the Russian Federation as of 22 December, 2008 N. 262-FZ 
“Relating to the implementation of access to information regarding operation of 
courts I Russian Federation,” official text, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 Dec 08 via 
http://www.rg.ru/2008/12/26/sud-internet-dok.html. 
(2) “Court system openness – secure barrier to corruption” The Supreme 
Arbitration Court of Russian Federation Official Website, 2 Dec 08 via 
http://www.arbitr.ru/press-centr/smi/20259.html. 
(3)”Brief description of the Special Federal Program ’Development of the Judicial 
System of Russia’ 2007-2011”  The Ministry of Economic Development of Russia 
Official Website, 12 Dec 09 via 
http://www.economy.gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/fcp/programs/fcpdoc.  
(4) “Court system openness,” Ibid.  
(5)”State automated system ‘Justice,’” The Supreme Court of Russian Federation 
Official Website, Last accessed 29 Mar 10 via 
http://www.supcourt.ru/news_detale.php?id=2559. 
(6) “Deputy Justice Minister: all courts ought to learn from arbitrazh,” The 
Supreme Arbitration Court of Russian federation Official Website, 26 Jan 10 via 
http://pda.arbitr.ru/press-centr/smi/26610.html. 
(7) Vladimir Novikov, “Openness of the judicial system: more questions than 
answers,” RIA-Novosti, 12 Feb 10 via 
http://www.rian.ru/pravo_issue/20100212/208928974.html. 
(8) Vladimir Novikov, “Position of the Supreme Arbitration Court of RF: everything 
must be published,” RIA-Novosti, 16 Mar 10 via 
http://www.rian.ru/pravo_analysis/20100316/214674845.html. 
(9) “Openness of the judicial system,” 
Ibid.http://www.rian.ru/pravo_issue/20100212/208928974.html  
(10) Ibid.  
(11) Lev Levinson, “The law on judicial closedness,” Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Russian Federation Official Website, 9 Dec 08 via 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/dad_2008/dad12/dad950/03.doc. 
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(12) Vladimir Novikov and Arkadiy Smolin, “Year of electronic justice,” RIA-
Novosti, 31 Dec 09 via http://rian.ru/pravo_issue/20091231/202466364.html. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) “Regarding citizens’ right to openness of the judiciary, ” Commissioner for 
Human Rights of the Russian Federation Official Website, 13 Nov 2008 via 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/doc/vistup11/z13_11_08.shtml. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
MVD to reform itself? 
In December 2009, President Dmitri Medvedev signed a decree that committed 
the Interior Ministry to a number of reforms.   The MVD is to make a 20% overall 
personnel cut, and to use the savings from these cuts to incentivize remaining 
staff. Changes in the agency’s hiring procedures—such as increased 
psychological screening--also are to be instituted, in order to weed out unsavory 
individuals. (1) In mid-February, President Medvedev fired 17 senior members of 
the ministry, and ordered that the MVD’s central apparatus also be subjected to 
cuts. (2) The number of those employed is to be reduced from 19,970 to 9,264, 
(3) and Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev is to submit proposals by the end of 
March on how to institute the changes effectively. 
 
In mid March, Nurgaliyev discussed the question of reform on several occasions. 
Addressing cadets at a boarding school near Moscow, he argued that the MVD 
was able to look at itself honestly, and could put its own “house in order,” 
insisting that “openness” has been a feature of the MVD’s “for five years now.” 
(4) A week later, Nurgaliyev told Militseyskaya Volna Radio that the proposals for 
new police laws are being worked on by the “best brains” in the country, including 
“practicing policemen.”     
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Once a draft document is completed, it will be posted on the Interior Ministry 
website, where the public will be able to read the proposals and provide 
feedback. (5) Only once the document is published, will it be possible to judge 
how seriously the issue of public trust in law-enforcement is being taken.  
 
As a footnote, it must be recognized that the question of real reform may now be 
academic: It is difficult at this stage to know what effect the Moscow Metro attack 
will have. Russia’s law enforcement agencies are likely to be ordered to begin a 
massive hunt for the perpetrators. Given the fact that the MVD is responsible for 
the Chechen theater of operations, it is possible that planned reforms may be put 
on hold for the foreseeable future. Making significant changes at a time of 
national crisis may be viewed as inadvisable.  
 
Metro bombings: Revenge for special operations 
On Monday morning, in the middle of rush hour, two explosions occurred on the 
Moscow Metro. The first detonation took place at Lubyanka station just after 8 
am, and the second occurred less than an hour later, at Park Kul’tury.  By 
Tuesday morning, the death toll from dual blasts was placed at 39, while 70 
people were hospitalized with varying degrees of injury. (6) Within a very short 
period of time, law enforcement authorities announced that the attack was 
executed by female suicide bombers with links to the North Caucasus, (7) and 
had confirmed that the devices were made of hexogen and were stuffed with 
“metal objects,” in order to “maximize casualties.” (8)  
    
The Metro stations in question were not random targets. Lubyanka station, as its 
name suggests, is beneath the Headquarters of the FSB, while Park Kul’tury is 
situated near the Defense Ministry, the Frunze Academy, and the Foreign 
Ministry. (9) Given these facts, it is obvious that this attack was a carefully 
planned operation, designed to strike at the heart of the Russian military and 
political establishment.  
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Initially, there was no claim of responsibility for the attack by any of Chechnya’s 
notable rebel commanders. In spite of this, the FSB announced that it believed 
the strike to be a revenge attack for the death last month in a special operation, 
of Said Buryatsky, aka Alexander Tikhomirov. (10) The FSB believes that 
Tikhomirov trained a total of 30 suicide bombers (nine of whom died in Monday’s 
or previous operations) and fears that the remainder of this group may already be 
in Moscow, planning further attacks. (11)  
 
The speed with which the FSB aired its theory raised some questions due to the 
short time lapse between Buryatsky’s death and this atrocity. Buryatsky was 
killed on March 3, and an operation as intricate as this was indicative of more 
than 3 weeks of planning. In light of Dokka Umarov’s warning last month that “the 
war is coming to their cities, ” and that “blood will no longer be limited to our cities 
and towns,” (12) it seemed too early to definitively assign responsibility. 
Umarov’s warning also implies that a sustained campaign against Russian 
targets is in the offing. The FSB’s theory also failed to take into account the fact 
that Chechen rebel leaders in the past have spoken out only once their planned 
operations were completed, and they had achieved their goals. 
 
President Medvedev’s response to the attack was to order the Interior Ministry to 
implement increased security measures in other cities in Russia with major public 
transportation networks, and to carry out a nationwide reassessment of current 
safety procedures. (13) At the political level, this latest attack is bound to result in 
major military and anti-terrorist operations being launched throughout the North 
Caucasus, with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin insisting that the perpetrators will 
“be destroyed.” (14)  
 
On Wednesday 31 March, two days after the bombings, a Chechen rebel website 
carried a video message from Dokka Umarov. Umarov claimed responsibility for 
the attack and noted that he had ordered the bombings in response to FSB 
special operations on 1 February in which “noncombatant” individuals allegedly 
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were deliberately gunned down. (15) Umarov indicated that more attacks are 
imminent – but failed to mention Buryatsky’s death as motivation.  
  
At the time of writing, the FSB apparently possesses at least one significant lead: 
CCTV footage of individuals believed to have acted as guides for the suicide 
bombers. (16) It is to be hoped that law enforcement authorities can use the 
images to track down any accomplices and interdict any further terrorists before 
they strike.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI, Number 7, Part I (28 January 2010). 
(2) “Work on reforming the Interior Ministry the President will keep under 
personal control,” The President of Russia Official Web Portal, 18 Feb 10 via 
http://news.kremlin.ru/news/6909. 
(3) “Russian Interior Ministry Central Apparatus Personnel to be cut by 50 per 
cent,” RIA Novosti News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 10 Mar 10; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(4) “Minister Says Russia’s Police Can Reform Themselves, Rights Activists 
Disagree,” Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 18 Mar 10; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(5) “Russia’s ‘Best Brains’ Working on ‘New In Spirit’ Law on Police—Minister,” 
Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 24 Mar 10; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) “Vladimir Putin Demands Moscow Bombing Suspects Caught,” BBC News, 
30 Mar 10 via www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8595162.stm.  
(7) “Double Suicide Bombings Kill 38 on Moscow Subway,” The Independent, 29 
Mar 10 via www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/moscow-blames-female-
bombers-1930187.html.  
(8) “Metro Bomb Kills 37, Female Suicide Bombers Suspected of Detonating Nail 
Bombs,” Interfax, 29 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
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(9) “Moscow Metro Bombing: The Backlash Begins,” The Guardian, 29 Mar 10 
via www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/29/moscow-metro-suicide-
bomb-caucasus.  
(10) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XVI, Number 10, Part I (18 Mar 10).  
(11) “Russian Security Services Hunt 21 Strong ‘Black Widow’ Cell,” The Times 
of London, 30 Mar 10 via 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7081316.ece.  
(12) “Double Suicide Bombings Kill 38 on Moscow Subway,” The Independent, 
29 Mar 10 via www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/moscow-blames-
female-bombers-1930187.html. 
(13) “Metro Bomb Kills 37, Female Suicide Bombers Suspected of Detonating 
Nail Bombs,” Interfax, 29 Mar 10; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(14) “Double Suicide Bombings Kill 38 on Moscow Subway,” The Independent, 
29 Mar 10 via www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/moscow-blames-
female-bombers-1930187.html. 
(15) “Umarov Claims Moscow Metro Blasts,” RFE/RL Newsline, 31 Mar 10 via 
www.rferl.org/content/Umarov_On_Video_Says_He_Ordered_Moscow_Attacks/1
999257.html. 
(16) “”Vladimir Putin In Moscow Suicide Bombing Police Plea,” BBC News, 30 
Mar 10 via www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8595162.stm. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Leadership fails to solve endemic bullying 
Reform in the Russian military has been progressing steadily.  Divisions and 
regiments have transformed into brigades.  The Defense Ministry has acquired 
modern, or at least new, military equipment, which has started to flow into 
combat units.  Yet, senior military leaders have failed to develop a professional 
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officer corps capable of ensuring good order and discipline at the unit level.   
Hazing, bullying or “non-regulation relations” in official parlance, continue to 
plague the army and could threaten the long-term viability of the conscript 
system. 
 
Over the past two years, 18 service men lost their lives at the hands of unit 
bullies. (1)  Another 429 service members committed suicide over the same 
period, which a human rights organization links to bullying. (2)  Suicide attempts 
may number as high as 8,500 if one considers there are approximately 20 
unsuccessful attempts for every suicide. (3)  Even more complaints of abuse, 
torture, forced prostitution and slave labor are submitted to organizations such as 
the St. Petersburg Soldiers’ Mothers group every month. (4) 
 
In 2009, the chief prosecutor convicted 1,167 service members of bullying, only 
slightly down from the 1,239 in 2008. (5)  If convictions only account for a fraction 
of the most severe cases of bullying, the Russian military has an endemic 
problem that will not be resolved on its own.  The solution will depend greatly on 
the leadership provided by the officer corps and the military justice system. 
 
The problem the conscript soldier faces is that there is practically nowhere to turn 
for recourse or justice, partly because the officer corps is part of the problem.  In 
2009, officers initiated one out of three hazing incidents in the army. (6)  Officer 
involvement in hazing only complicates the issue since commanding officers are 
responsible for initial investigations. (7)  In the time it takes the military 
investigations officer to arrive on scene, the commanding officer and his 
subordinates can easily manipulate the evidence.  According to the Russian 
Prosecutor-General’s office, “the vicious practice of individual commanders 
covering up crimes in cases where service men receive traumas has not yet 
disappeared.” (8)  
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Late last year, the entire command of a military unit in the Leningrad Region was 
dismissed after conspiring with military investigators to cover up acts of torture, 
beatings, failures to render medical aid, extortion, and theft. (9)   The officers 
dismissed included a company commander, the brigade commander, his chief of 
staff and deputies. (10)  To add insult to injury, Colonel Aslambekov, the 
dismissed commanding officer, distributed three million rubles in performance 
bonuses to himself and the dismissed officers. (11)  It is interesting to note that 
he did not distribute a single ruble to any of the officers that remained in the 
brigade.  
 
General Makarov, the chief of General Staff, has identified training experience 
shortfalls, especially at the senior leader level (colonel-general to colonel), that 
need to be resolved immediately. (12)  Senior leaders were required to take 
supplementary courses earlier this year to learn how to train subordinate 
command elements and individual soldiers. (13)  After receiving the training, 
commanders are expected to conduct training sessions with their leaders at the 
brigade level and below starting in May 2010. (14) 
 
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev recently announced that the leadership of 
the country also would be developing the professional standards of the Armed 
Forces. (15)  It is critical for military officers to embrace high standards and 
establish reliable training and leadership for their units.  According to retired 
Colonel Kanshin, "Ninety per cent of servicemen are composed of young enlisted 
personnel and NCOs, who need daily and hourly engagement. The young boys' 
beliefs, principles, and moral positions are only just taking shape. It is for society 
of considerable importance, therefore, with what principles they joined the army 
and with what they return to civilian life. For it is not hard to understand what 
could happen to those whom the state teaches ways of conducting combat 
operations, but for whom it does not provide a moral foundation..." (16) 
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The second problem conscripts face is an absence of legal representation.  In 
2009, 50,000 service members submitted complaints and lawsuits related to 
violations of their rights to the military courts. (17)  Not surprisingly, conscripts 
submitted only 203 of those complaints. (18)  According to Vladimir Khomchik, 
Chairman of the Military Board of the Russian Supreme Court, the military 
conscript is legally the least protected category of service member in the Russian 
armed forces. (19)   
 
Consequently, conscripts are terribly isolated in their units.  Once faced with 
abuse, conscripts do not have a reliable option to resolve their problem.  Officers 
have proven to be corrupt and prone to cover up instances of abuse within their 
units.  The courts are difficult to access, requiring conscripts to deliver 
statements to courts located miles from the conscript’s base.  If both shortfalls 
continue, recruiting will become increasingly difficult for the Russian military as 
the conscript describes his experience when he returns to his hometown. 
 
Current public opinion finds that 75% of Russians consider bullying the greatest 
evil in the Russian military. (20)  This public sentiment has increased 30% over 
the past ten years.  In addition, 40% of Russians are concerned with the 
deprivation of human rights and humiliation of military service men. (21)  The 
aforementioned statistics will only serve to make Russia’s annual draft of 
700,000 conscripts increasingly difficult in the future. (22)  Considering only 
740,000 men reach military age each year, (23) it is clear why President 
Medvedev has prioritized improving professional standards in the military.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Russia military prosecutors to try to reduce army suicide rate, Interfax-AVN, 
29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; Galina Stolyarova, “Non-Combat Deaths 
Plague Russian Army,” The St. Petersburg Times, No. 1551 (26 Feb 10); 
available from http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=30874. 
(2) Ibid. 
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(3) World Health Organization, “Introduction to figures and facts about suicide” 
(2000): 1; available from http://www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/382.pdf. 
(4) Stolyarova, “Non-Combat Deaths.” 
(5) Bullying in Russian Armed Forces still widespread – official, Interfax-AVN, 23 
Mar 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) Officers Initiate One Third Of Hazing Incidents In Army, Interfax-AVN Online, 
9 Mar 10; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(7) Russian human rights activists takes issue with army statistics on bullying, 
Gazeta.ru, 7 Oct 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(8) Russian prosecutor’s office says army bullying not disappearing, Interfax-
AVN, 17 Dec 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection.  
(9) Russia: Top officers sacked over bullying in military unit – radio, Ekho Moskvy 
Radio, 10 Dec 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection; 
Russia: Army Corruption Growing Despite Action Taken, Nasha Versiya, 17 Mar 
10; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Russia: Army Corruption Growing, Nasha Versiya. 
(12) General Staff chief says Russia cannot afford professional army at this time, 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 23 Mar 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) Russia: Medvedev pledges support for army, attention to its social issues, 
Interfax, 15 Mar 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(16) Bullying in Russian army attributed to fewer political officers, 
Komsomolskaya pravda, 21 Mar 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(17) Russian conscripts’ access to legal defence limited – supreme court official, 
Interfax-AVN, 23 Mar 10 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(18) Ibid. 
(19) Ibid. 
(20) Majority of Russians consider bullying as main reason fro army dodging – 
poll, 23 Feb 10; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
 18 
(21) Ibid. 
(22) Russian conscripts', Interfax-AVN. 
(23) CIA: The World Factbook, Russia; available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Reset and re-START 
After months of stalled efforts, US and Russian negotiators appear to have finally 
come to an agreement regarding the renewed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START). If ratified in both countries, the agreement is supposed to result in a 
total overall reduction in deployed nuclear weapons (both warheads and delivery 
vehicles) to their lowest level in the history of nuclear arms control - that is, since 
the late 1960s. (1) 
 
The announcement was made following a telephone conversation between 
presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev on 26 March, during which the 
presidents agreed that the treaty would be signed April 8, 2010 in Prague. 
According to the announcement, the final draft of the treaty has been produced; 
all that is left now is to sort out technical details of its actual signing. If that is 
indeed the case, the agreement will be a significant personal achievement for 
both presidents, who devoted considerable attention to this project. (2) 
 
Obama's effort—conceived as a cornerstone of his "reset" policy to restore good 
faith in US-Russian relations—represents the third attempt to renew the original 
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START, an agreement initially conceived by then-Soviet Premier Mikhail 
Gorbachev and US President George H.W. Bush in 1991. Negotiations over 
START II, which was supposed to reflect the new post-Soviet reality and replace 
the original agreement, dragged on for the duration of the Yeltsin presidency, and 
in the end the treaty was abandoned, following the US withdrawal from the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) limitation treaty in 2002. Additionally, around 1997, as 
part of the START II negotiations, presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the 
possibility of a START III to replace START II once it expired - which of course 
became moot after START II failed to go into force after 2002. For this reason, 
the new START has been described as the most important breakthrough on 
nuclear arms control in post-Soviet history. (3) 
 
The new START will replace an existing agreement called SORT, which was 
signed in 2002 by presidents Putin and George W. Bush. This rather loose arms 
reduction agreement called for a reduction of the total number of deployed 
nuclear warheads to a level of 1700-2200 each, but—unlike the terms proposed 
under START—does not call for the actual destruction of warhead and delivery 
vehicles – only for their removal from active deployment. (4) Nonetheless, the 
agreements reached leading to SORT are significant in that they continued the 
overall trend in gradual nuclear arms reduction initiated under the original 
START. Moreover, independently of any political agreement, both countries have 
for some time been in the processes of downsizing their respective nuclear 
arsenals. (5) Thus, with the announcement of the "reset" policy in US-Russian  
relations by the Obama administration, it appears arms reduction may be 
something relatively easy for both countries to agree upon. 
 
Throughout the negotiations on the new START, Russian strategy apparently 
was focused on using the treaty to reverse US plans for missile defense systems 
in former Soviet satellite states. The American position has been, and remains, 
that missile defense is not to be part of the framework of the agreement (US 
Republican senators Mitch McConnell and Jon Kyl recently made it clear to 
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Obama that any compromise on this issue would result in a refusal by Congress 
to ratify the treaty.) (6) The Russians, for their part, up until very recently have 
insisted on the converse: that any new agreement must include a provision 
limiting missile defense. Such was the Kremlin's official position until only a few 
days ago. (7) In the end, however, Russia agreed to a compromise whereby the 
preamble to the treaty includes a statement relating missile defense systems to 
the overall issue of strategic arms control, but not elaborating beyond this point. It 
was this formula—mentioning missile defense, but not prohibiting it—that finally 
enabled the two sides to come to an agreement. 
 
What led to the Russian “change of heart” may be impossible to determine for 
certain, but several possibilities exist. According to a New York Times 
investigative report, in February 2010, when the subject of missile defense was 
raised again, Obama, with a tone of frustration over Russian demands on missile 
defense, told Medvedev that the US would “walk away from the treaty.” (8) 
Perhaps as a result of this exchange, it seems that the Russians have come to 
realize that the idea of using the new START treaty to thwart US missile defense 
plans would simply not work. Given this reality, Medvedev—who, like Obama, 
had invested some political and personal capital into the talks—chose to 
cooperate. 
 
One point in the new agreement that was emphasized in official Russian 
announcements is a provision restricting the deployment of land-based strategic 
nuclear weapons to the territories of Russia and the US. (9) This clause is 
unsurprisingly seen as a gain for Russia, as it effectively prohibits the stationing 
of any strategic weapons (if not missile defense systems) in former Warsaw Pact 
countries or ex-Soviet republics. Whether or not this is a real concession on 
behalf of the US (there is no evidence to suggest that such deployments were 
being planned or indeed would be needed, given the already sufficient range of 
long-range land, air and sea-borne missiles), its inclusion provides a convenient 
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"victory" for Medvedev, which he can use to counter criticism that the new treaty 
gives the US excessive concessions. 
 
The US-Russian negotiations on START represent a measure of achievement in 
Obama's goal of resetting relations with Russia; put another way, the failure of 
START would have spelled the failure of the "reset" policy. It appears that for the 
time being, Moscow appears willing to concede on missile defense, in order to 
maintain the impression that the "reset" is working - perhaps hoping that by doing 
so, it may be able to extract favorable concessions elsewhere. 
 
Update: Iran sanctions revisited 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to Moscow in mid-March addressed a 
number of other key topics in US-Russian relations beyond the issue of arms 
control. Among these was the now familiar theme of the Iranian nuclear program 
and what to do about it. 
 
Shortly before meeting with the US Secretary of State, Putin—before any other 
official Russian pronouncements on the issue—announced that the Russian-
contracted nuclear power plant in Bushehr would begin operations this summer. 
(10) This Russian position—later officially confirmed by Foreign Minister 
Lavrov—came as a response to an American suggestion that delaying the launch 
of the reactor be used as a possible "stick" (in addition to other sanctions) in 
pressuring Tehran to cooperate with US demands on its nuclear program. Lavrov 
claimed that launching the reactor would persuade Iran to cooperate with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. (11) Returning to the question of sanctions, 
Medvedev equivocated: Addressing delegates from the League of Arab States in 
Moscow, Medvedev said that sanctions are "undesirable, but may be necessary." 
(12) 
 
Viewed in the context of the START negotiations, Russia’s apparent inflexibility 
on the Iranian question may be related to the fact that Moscow believes it already 
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has given ground on the issue of missile defense, and does not wish to be seen 
making further concessions. As with START, however, too much intransigence 
runs the risk of undermining the "reset" policy, possibly leading to negative 
repercussions for Russia or at least the loss of opportunity to secure gains 
because of it. Thus, Russia is likely to continue its present strategy of dangling 
the promise of cooperation on Iran, while avoiding a commitment to any 
meaningful action. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Kovytka: reprise and rivalry 
On March 23, Viktor Vekselberg, one of four Russian billionaire co-owners of 
TNK-BP, announced that the Russian-British venture would sell its concession in 
Kovykta gas field to state holding company Rosneftegaz by the end of 2010 for 
$700 to $900 million. (1) Kovykta’s strategic location in Irkutsk Oblast makes it a 
core project from which to launch the full scale development of East Siberian gas 
reserves for Siberian customers in the region and, eventually, customers in 
Asian-Pacific countries, where Russian gas exports are expected to begin 
sometime around 2013-2015. At a price of $700 to $900 million, Rosneftegaz is 
getting a relative bargain for a field worth an estimated $20 billion, but the state’s 
offer must nevertheless have come as a relief to the beleaguered shareholders of 
TNK-BP, who one month earlier faced the very real prospect of losing their rights 
to the field without any compensation whatsoever. Russia’s environmental 
protection agency, Rosprirodnadzor, issued a recommendation in February that 
TNK-BP be stripped of its license after it found that the company had failed to 
meet the production quotas stipulated in its licensing agreement. (2) With the 
sale to Rosneftegaz, TNK-BP will at least recoup its $664 million investment in a 
field where vast natural gas reserves—estimated at 1.9 trillion cubic meters—
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qualify the deposit as a strategic asset subject to renationalization if its operating 
license is revoked. (3) Recognizing from the start that Kovykta’s potential was 
mined with political risks, TNK-BP never registered the field’s gas reserves on 
the company books. 
 
Indeed, the only real surprise in current events is the uncanny familiarity of it all. 
Three years ago, TNK-BP faced an identical set of circumstances—
Rosprirodnadzor threatened to strip the company of its license after an inspection 
revealed that the company was not living up to its required production quota of 9 
billion cubic meters of gas per year. (4) That time, British co-owner BP protested 
that such high levels of production made little sense because the only market 
available for Kovykta was in the surrounding Irkutsk Oblast, where there was only 
need for, at most, 2.5 billion cubic meters of gas. In spite of its key eastern 
location, Kovykta lacks supporting infrastructure that would allow TNK-BP to 
move supplies to target markets in East Asia. Gazprom, the state gas export 
monopoly, refused TNK-BP access to its pipeline network and shot down BP’s 
proposal to finance a private pipeline for Kovykta. (5) Moreover, the East Asian 
export markets that TNK-BP had targeted when it bought into the field remained 
off limits under a federal law that reserved Russian gas exports for Gazprom 
alone. (6) Then-President Vladimir Putin stepped into the fray to chide BP, 
insisting that the British company had been fully aware of these constraints 
beforehand, and should never have entered into the licensing agreement if it did 
not intend to honor its terms. TNK-BP shareholders viewed the government 
campaign as a tactic meant to pry away Kovykta in a cheap sale as Gazprom 
energized its focus on gas exports to China. 
 
BP scrambled to salvage the company’s assets by offering to sell its 62.42 
percent stake in the project to Gazprom for $700 to $900 million in June 2007. (7) 
The deal never came to fruition, however, after events in the succeeding years 
intervened; first a shareholder dispute between TNK-BP’s four Russian 
billionaires and directors at BP threatened to dissolve the joint venture, then the 
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financial crisis struck, driving down demand among Gazprom’s key European 
customers at the same time that increased deliveries of liquefied natural gas 
drove down spot prices across Europe. In 2010, Gazprom reversed its prior 
stance on Kovytka and announced that it no longer needed the field to supply 
Asian-Pacific markets. (8) Days later, Rosprirodnadzor once again threatened to 
strip TNK-BP of its license, and declared that the government would not 
reimburse the company for its investment in Kovykta, but that the field’s future 
owner could choose appropriate compensation. 
 
With the Kovykta license once again in limbo, TNK-BP shareholder Viktor 
Vekselberg stepped in with a warning that any attempt to renationalize the field 
would create a crisis of confidence among international investors, to which 
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin responded with assurances that the 
government would take TNK-BP’s sunk costs into account, and that there would 
be no “blatant expropriation”. (9) That announcement was doubly significant 
because, in addition to his role in the government, Sechin simultaneously chairs 
Rosneft, the state-controlled oil group that he has begun to steer further into the 
gas industry, territory that has traditionally been Gazprom’s by right. At the time 
that Sechin promised to withhold the government’s commandeering hand, his 
Rosneft had just entered into talks with TNK-BP to take over the Kovykta field for 
the already familiar price of $700 to $900 million. (10) The scenario represented 
a reprise of the events of 2007, only this time Rosneft seems to be stepping into 
the shoes of Gazprom in a strong-arm bid to take over the field. 
 
For now, it appears that Rosneftegaz, which holds 75.16 percent of Rosneft and 
10.74 percent of Gazprom, will take control of Kovykta by year’s end. (11) In the 
short term, this means that another Russian-foreign joint venture has been forced 
to give up a lucrative asset to the state. A more interesting question arises in the 
long-term: is Gazprom still the preferred instrument to effect such a takeover, or 
is Rosneft’s star on the rise in the east? 
 
 26 
Source Notes: 
(1) “TNK-BP getting rid of Kovykta,” Gazeta.ru, 23 Mar 10 Via 
(http://gazeta.ru/business/2010/03/23/3341963.shtml). 
(2) “Rosprirodnadzor Recommends Revocation of TNK-BP's Kovykta Gas Field 
License,” HIS Global Insight, 18 Feb 10 Via 
(http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail18287.htm). 
(3) “Expropriation without rudeness,” Vedomosti, 3 Mar 10 Via 
(http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/03/12/227927).  
(4) “TNK-BP getting rid of Kovykta,” Gazeta.ru, 23 Mar 10 Via 
(http://gazeta.ru/business/2010/03/23/3341963.shtml). 
(5) “Gas transportation options from the Kovykta field,” TNK-BP website, 13 Jul 
07 Via (Kovykta_Integr_Report_2007-07-13_brief_eng.pdf). 
(6) “TNK-BP getting rid of Kovykta,” Gazeta.ru, 23 Mar 10 Via 
(http://gazeta.ru/business/2010/03/23/3341963.shtml). 
(7) “BP’s Russian Deal Oils the Wheels,” BusinessWeek, 22 Jun 07 Via 
(http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jun2007/gb20070622_001502.h
tm). 
(8) “TNK-BP getting rid of Kovykta,” Gazeta.ru, 23 Mar 10 Via 
(http://gazeta.ru/business/2010/03/23/3341963.shtml). 
(9) “TNK-BP poised to sell Kovykta gas field,” The Financial Times, 24 Mar 10 
Via (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/280d2642-36e6-11df-bc0f-00144feabdc0.html). 
(10) “TNK-BP getting rid of Kovykta,” Gazeta.ru, 23 Mar 10 Via 
(http://gazeta.ru/business/2010/03/23/3341963.shtml). 
(11) “Expropriation without rudeness,” Vedomosti, 3 Mar 10 Via 
(http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/03/12/227927). 
 
 
Copyright Boston University Trustees 2010 
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol16/ed1611a.shtml. 
